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THE PROCESS OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL RAPPROCHEMENT
BETWEEN BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA IN 1920s AND 1930s – AN
INTERNATIONAL ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE1

By Priit Rohtmets and Radmila Radić
Priit Rohtmets has a PhD in theology and is currently a researcher of church history at the University of
Tartu, Estonia. He is a member of a research project at the University of Tartu ‘Secularization (Deinstitutionalization and De-Christianization): Religion in Estonia from the Modern Period to the Present’.
In his research Rohtmets has focused on Estonian and Baltic church history in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, the emergence of national theology, state–church relations, and the relationship
between nationalism and religion in Northern Europe. He has done research on the ecumenical
movement, focusing primarily on a peace organization, the World Alliance for Promoting Friendship
through the Churches, and was co-editor of the book History of Estonian Ecumenism. Email:
priit.rohtmets@ut.ee
Radmila Radić, is the Principal Research Fellow, Institute for the Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade,
Serbia. In 1982 she graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, Department of History,
received her M.A. in 1986, and PhD (Historical Science) 1992. Since 1983 she works at the Institute for
Recent History of Serbia. In 2003 she became the Senior Adviser. From 2002-2005 she was the editor-in -chief of the Redaction of monographs and from 2005-2009 of the journal Tokovi istorije. She
participated in several domestic and international projects and scientific meetings. Her research fields are
social history, the Serbian Orthodox Church history, relations between the State and religious
communities in the 19th and 20th centuries. Dr. Radić is the author of numerous books. Email:
mandicr58@gmail.com

Abstract:
This article addresses the role of the ecumenical organization, the World Alliance for Promoting
International Friendship through the Churches, in the complicated process of religious and
political rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the 1920s and 1930s. It argues that
the Bulgarian and Yugoslav National Committees of the World Alliance formed a diplomatic
channel for tackling the problems between the two countries, predominantly the question of

1

An earlier version of this article appeared in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies, vol. 50, no. 4 (Fall, 2015), pp.
583-605, titled "The World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches and Religious and Political
Rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the 1920’s and 1930’s." This expanded version is used with
permission from J.E.S.
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Macedonia, but ultimately the rapprochement process between the two countries failed due to the
outbreak of World War II.

Introduction
In 1937, the representatives of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Tsardom of Bulgaria
signed a Pact of Eternal Friendship. The declaration of friendship was a result of a process of
political and religious rapprochement that had begun near the end of 1920s. In this context, the
influence of the ecumenical movement, especially the peace organization World Alliance for
Promoting International Friendship through the Churches, (hereafter abbreviated to WA), has to
be highlighted. The history of the ecumenical movement briefly mentions that discussions held
among the leading ecumenical representatives and Balkan religious leaders led to an exchange of
visits between official delegations of the Serbian and Bulgarian churches. These visits paved the
way for a similar action on the political level.2 The activity of the ecumenical movement and the
discussions and visits mentioned above have largely been neglected in the national histories of
the two countries and in the history of international relations between the two World Wars. In
this article, we aim to discuss the contribution of the WA in the rapprochement process between
the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC), and the states
of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1920s and 1930s. To fully understand the chain of events and
the role the WA had in the process of rapprochement, we first examine the foreign policy and the
ideology of the two countries as well as the activity of the WA.

2

Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill, eds. History of the Ecumenical Movement. Volume I, 1517–
1948 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2004), 562.
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Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations and the “Macedonian problem”3
From the middle of the nineteenth century up to the 1930s, Serbian-Bulgarian and later
Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations were marked by conflicts over Macedonia: the national revival of
the Macedonian population, and by wars (the Serb-Bulgarian War 1885–86, the Second Balkan
War 1913, and the First World War 1914–1918). Agreements of friendship and cooperation
(1897, 1904, and 1912) were only brief episodes of relief in a conflict that lasted for decades.
The “Macedonian Question”, i.e. the status of Macedonia and its relations with Greece, Bulgaria
and Serbia, though officially settled with treaties of Bucharest, London and Paris (1912, 1913,
1919), remained a constant problem in the Balkans throughout the interwar years.4

About Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations see: Živko Avramovski, “O stavu jugoslovenske vlade prema
devetojunskom prevratu u Bugarskoj 1923. Godine,” Istorija XX veka, IX (1968), 132–86; Desanka
Todorović, “Pitanje jugoslovensko-bugarske granice na Mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919. Godine,”
Istorija XX veka, IX (1968), 63–132; Г. Васиљевиќ, Хронологија на настаните од југословенскобугарските односи за време на владеењето на Александар Стамболиски, (Skopje, 1973); Desanka
Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923, (Belgrade,1976); Ž. Avramovski (ed.),
Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, I–II, (Belgrade, 1980–1982); Živko Avramovski, “Pitanje
balkanskog garantnog pakta i jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 1925. godine u svetlu britanske politike na
Balkanu,” Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 2 (Belgrade, 1984), 87–111; Živko Avramovski, Balkanska antanta
1934–1940, (Belgrade, 1986); Branko Pavlica, “Razgraničenje Jugoslavije s Bugarskom (1919–1922),”
Tokovi istorije, 1–2 (2002), 16–23; Dmitar Tasić, “Prisajedinjenje Caribroda i Bosiljgrada Kraljevini SHS
1920,” Tokovi istorije, 3 (2007), 121–31.
4
According to Miroslav Hroch the Macedonian national identity became relevant only in the 1870s. By
1900 some intellectuals had formulated the concept of a Macedonian nation based on the linguistic
differences between the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages, the specificities of their geography and
historical development. Miroslav Hroch, ‘National Movements in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires’, in
John Breuilly (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism (Oxford, 2013), 192. Even today
there is no agreement about roots of the Macedonian national identity. According to Bulgarian historians
the Macedonian nation was created after the Second World War.
3
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Disputes were conducted through diplomatic and academic circles, press and propaganda
channels abroad, through international organizations as well as by representatives of cultural,
educational, and religious institutions.5
In the interwar period, the relations between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,
(the KSCS) and the Tsardom of Bulgaria can be divided into two periods. During the first stage,
in the 1920s, the main issue on the agenda was the enforcement of the peace agreements and the
curbing of the Macedonian nationalist movement. A precondition set by the KSCS for
developing friendly relations with Bulgaria was that Bulgaria should shut down the Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) base on Bulgarian territory and withhold
logistical support to that organization.6 During the second stage, in 1930s, a gradual
rapprochement between the two countries took place, in which the SOC and the BOC played an
essential part.
After the First World War, according to the Treaty of Neuilly signed in November 1919,
the Tsardom of Bulgaria had lost its border territories Caribrod (now Dimitrovgrad), Bosilegrad,
the right side of the river Timok (today in the south-eastern part of the Republic of Serbia), and

5

Macedonia was divided between Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria according to the provisions of the London
Peace Treaty signed on May 30, 1913. Vardar Macedonia was ceded to Serbia, Aegean Macedonia to
Greece and Pirin Macedonia to Bulgaria. Dragoslav Stranjaković, “Srbi i Bugari u prošlosti,” Glasnik
SPP, 9 (September 1—August 19, 1946), 157–63; Andrew Rossos, “The British Foreign Office and
Macedonian National Identity, 1918–1941,” Slavic Review, 53, 2 (Summer 1994); Ivan Ristić, “Politika
sporazumevanja u vreme nerazumevanja,” Teme, 3 (2012), 1033–46.
6
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija,
founded in Thessaloniki 1893 (name used since 1919) rejected the partition and called for a free
Macedonia – independent or autonomous, i.e. reunited with Bulgaria. This goal was not to be achieved
only through peaceful means, but also by attacks aimed at the Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Greek authorities,
who were considered to be occupiers. As the stronghold of the organization was in Bulgaria, the state
authorities there had a profound influence on controlling the activities of the organization. Until 1924, the
IMRO was led by Todor Aleksandrov and after his assassination by Ivan Mihailov. Dmitar Tasić,
“Vojno-politička akcija ‘makedonstvujuščih’ u Kraljevini SHS/Jugoslaviji 1919–1934. Godine,” Arhiv, 3
(2002), 92–107; Ivan Ristić, “Diplomatsko-konzularna predstavništva i predstavnici Kraljevine SHS u
Bugarskoj 1920–1929,” Arhiv, 1–2 (2012), 97–112.
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Strumica (today in the south-eastern part of the Republic of Macedonia).7 Starting in 1919 the
Macedonians organized raids into Greek and Yugoslav Macedonian territories. These raids were
usually launched from Petrich, a district in South West Bulgaria, where the Macedonians had
established a virtual state within the state.8
In the beginning of the 1920s the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and
the Prime Minister from 1919 to 1923, Aleksandar Stamboliyski, was prepared to control and
even cooperate with the IMRO. At the same time, he denounced Macedonian extremism and
declared this publically during his visit to Belgrade in 1922. In March 1923, the two countries
signed an agreement in Niš and promised to fight extremism.9 This agreement was one of the
reasons for a coup d'état in Bulgaria that took place in June 1923. Stamboliyski was forced to
step down and was brutally murdered by Macedonian extremists. At first, the KSCS considered
the coup a direct threat to its security, but the situation was eased by the mediation of foreign
allies. In the following years, several Bulgarian political emigrants resided in the KSCS. The
violence of Macedonian extremists in Bulgaria continued during the ‘Tsankovist period’ from

7

Peace Treaty of Neuilly between the Allied and Associated countries and Bulgaria was signed on
November 27, 1919. Bulgaria as a defeated country was to pay war reparations to the winning side; its
armed forces were drastically reduced and general conscription was abolished. According to the treaty,
Bulgaria was obligated to punish the perpetrators for the war and recognize the KSCS, who signed the
treaty on December 5, 1919. Ivan Ristić, “Bugarska politička emigracija u Kraljevini SHS,” Istorija XX
veka, 2 (2012), 41–62.
8
Macedonians levied special taxes on the peasants in their Petrich enclave. Apart from inducing fear of
Macedonian terror in Bulgaria, the Macedonians fought among themselves as well. They had two main
factions – the main split was between the autonomists (right) and federalists (left). Unlike the left, the
right waged an armed struggle. In the beginning of 1920s, the conflict led to the occupation of the city of
Nevrokop by an IMRO unit, which tried to annihilate the local federalist branch. The attacks were so
fierce that the head of the BOC, Metropolitan Stefan, suggested privately that the state authorities should
pay the autonomists 50 million leva to cease their attacks. R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria (Oxford 2008), 229–
30.
9
The Niš Treaty signed on March 23, 1923, allowed the KSCS to fight against IMRO on Bulgarian
territory, since Stamboliyski could not rely on the weak Bulgarian army. He had created an alternative
armed force, the Orange Guard. According to the Niš Treaty, the two countries agreed to keep order along
the border by joint patrolling.
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1923 to 1926, under the rule of Prime Minister Aleksander Tsankov. Although it was
internationally condemned, Tsankov’s government cooperated with the IMRO. The IMRO
projected a confusing double image – it was an organization that was often fighting violently for
the Macedonian national cause, but at the same time it was an instrument used by Bulgaria to
overcome the losses of the First World War and to pursue the goal of a Great Bulgaria.10
Bulgarian authorities criticized Belgrade for protecting Bulgarian immigrants and
demanded that Belgrade move them out of the border areas. Another issue for mistrust was the
implementation of cultural and educational policy in Macedonia. Bulgaria demanded that the
people living in Vardar Macedonia had to be identified as Bulgarian, primarily through changes
in the local school system.11 The Yugoslav side was not prepared to meet those demands.
Instead, the KSCS continued a policy of assimilation, previously conducted by the Kingdom of
Serbia, rather than to recognize the Macedonian identity of the local population. The KSCS
quickly acted to eliminate the Patriarchal (Greek) influence in the south of Vardar and the
Exarchist Bulgarian presence. In September 1920, the Macedonian Orthodox community in
Vardar Macedonia was transferred to the jurisdiction of SOC.12The Greeks implemented the
same kind of policy in Aegean Macedonia.13

10

A. Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians (California, 2008), 150.
Bulgarian nationalist ideology engaged historiography, ethnography, and Völkerpsyhologie to provide it
with arguments to lay nationalist claims on territories outside Bulgaria, such as Macedonia. They argued
that all Slav-speakers in Macedonia were “Bulgarians”. Greek and Serbian nationalists supported the
jurisdiction the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople over the Christian population in Macedonia,
while Bulgarian nationalist ideology stressed language as the most important and visible marker on which
the Bulgarian national as well as the ecclesiastical autonomy from the ecumenical patriarchate was based.
Marius Turda, “National Historiographies in the Balkans, 1830–1989,” in Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz
(eds.), The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories, (New York,
2011), 476.
12
Unification of Serbian regional churches under one ecclesiastical authority was proclaimed in Belgrade
in 1919, but it was finally carried out only after the Churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Old Serbia and
Macedonia seperated from the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As a result of
negotiations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate from 1913 to 1914, Southern parts of the Church were to
11
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The crisis between Bulgaria and the KSCS was reflected in assassinations, attacks on
properties separated by the border, bomb planting, kidnapping, and disruption of rail traffic
between the two countries, thus generating a general atmosphere of insecurity. In addition to
violence, Macedonian cultural, educational, and folk organizations (Macedonian National
Committee) in Bulgaria, as well as magazines and various nationalist organizations like Otec
Paisij managed to cause some misinterpretations.14
After King Alexander I of Yugoslavia suspended the constitution and proclaimed a royal
dictatorship in 1929, the leaders of Ustaša – Croatian Revolutionary Organization (UCRO) and
IMRO reached an agreement on future actions and signed a declaration of mutual understanding
known as the Sofia Declaration. This declaration envisaged the establishment of independent
states of Croatia and Macedonia. Actions of Macedonians placed Bulgaria in considerable
danger.

be joined to the Church of the Kingdom of Serbia, but due to the war the decision was not implemented.
In late July 1919, negotiations in Constantinople began again. According to the agreement between the
Ecumenical Patriarchate, the KSCS and the SOC, the unity of the SOC and reestablishment of the
Patriarchate was recognized. An agreement was reached that the dioceses, which had been under the
jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate were now transferred to the jurisdiction of the SOC. These
were: Skopje, Ras-Prizren and Debar-Veles, part of the Metropolis Voden, Diocese Polean-Doiran and
diocese of Strumica. Under Article V of the agreement, the Government of the KSCS was to help the
Patriarchate of Constantinople financially with 1.5 million francs. The Ministry of Finance of the KSCS
paid that amount in three payments in 1919 and 1922. Radmila Radić, Život u vremenima: Patrijarh
Gavrilo (Dožić) 1881–1950, (Belgrade, 2011), 146–47.
13
In September 1924, Bulgaria and Greece signed the Kalfov-Politis Agreement, in which Greece
recognized Bulgarian nationals on its Macedonian territory. Thus a crisis broke out in the relations
between the KSCS and Greece, because the KSCS feared that this agreement could justify Bulgaria’s
claims that the Vardar Macedonians were Bulgarians as well. As the KSCS threatened to abrogate its
alliance with Greece, the latter pronounced the agreement void. A. Rossos, Macedonia and the
Macedonians, 133–50.
14
Desanka Todorović, “Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u drugoj polovini 1923. (Kriza u septembru),” in
Ž. Avramovski (ed), Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, I (Belgrade, 1980), 179–96; Vuk
Vinaver, “KPJ i jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 1919–1939. Godine,” in Ž. Avramovski (ed),
Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, II (Belgrade, 1982), 170; Živko Avramovski, “Makedonsko
pitanje u jugoslovensko-bugarskim odnosima od 1918–1925. Godine,” in Ž. Avramovski (ed),
Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, I (Belgrade, 1980), 147–76; Petar Dragišić, Jugoslovenskobugarski odnosi 1944–1949, (Belgrade, 2007), 13; D. Tasić, “Vojno-politička akcija,”, 92–107.
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The ascension of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany encouraged the revisionist forces in
Europe and increased insecurity. In particular, the situation became more difficult due to the
tightening of relations around issues of disarmament and the certainty that the Conference on
Disarmament would not be a success. It was concluded in London that the change in the military
and political balance on the continent might lead to the outbreak of war. Great Britain took
diplomatic steps to bring about reconciliation between the major powers.15
In September 1933 the Permanent Council of the Little Entente met in Sinaiа to discuss
the need for a Balkan pact. Bulgaria was invited to join Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, and
Turkey. However, Bulgaria refused to join if in return it did not get the territorial exit to the
Aegean Sea and demanded that the rights of Bulgarian minority in neighboring countries be
honored. At the same time Bulgaria openly expressed the need to strengthen relations with
Yugoslavia.16 Yugoslavia and Bulgaria already entered into a new phase of relations. Small signs
of improvement could already be seen by the end of 1920s when the two countries signed the
Pirot Agreements over minor issues like the railway connections. At the end of the 1920s an

15

In Spring 1933, Prime Minister McDonald personally attended the Conference on Disarmament, to
demonstrate its importance. On the way, he stopped in Paris and tried to win over the French government
for its policy of pacification, which included the reduction of the French armed forces, in order to save the
Conference on Disarmament and prevent uncontrolled arming of Germany. Not having found adequate
response in Paris, McDonald began to implement his campaign together with Italy. In order it to be a
success McDonald was ready to make certain concessions to the revisionist countries. The result of this
policy was the Four-Power Pact project also known as a Quadripartite Agreement. This had an impact on
the position of the Balkan states. Countries of Little Entente – Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania
– were vigorously against the Four-Power Pact and revision of the peace treaties thus undertaking a
campaign in Paris to dissuade France from accession to the Pact. Turkey saw the Pact as a threat that
could lead to revival of plans for the division of its territory. Ž. Avramovski, “Stav britanske diplomatije
prema sklapanju Balkanskog sporazuma (1933–1934),” Radovi, 16 (1983), 139–80.
16
Yugoslav and Bulgarian royal couples met three times in second half of 1933. Additionally a series of
cultural events were organized which contributed to the rapprochement of the two countries. Ž.
Avramovski, “Stav britanske diplomatije,” 150; Vladan Jovanović, Vardarska banovina 1929–1941,
(Belgrade, 2011), 316.
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Association for the Balkan Union was established, which held its first conference in 1930. 17 At
the Balkan Conferences held from 1930 to 1933, in addition to economic, cultural, social, and
legal cooperation, the possibility of drawing up a Balkan political pact was also discussed. The
Macedonian question, again, proved to be a fundamental precondition for establishing some sort
of political cooperation in the Balkans.18 Other Balkan countries interpreted the YugoslavBulgarian rapprochement as a threat of Slav hegemony in the Balkans. Already in the autumn of
1933, Тurkеу and Romania made preparations to sign a Balkan pact of four countries from which
Bulgaria would be excluded. After the visit of Tsar Boris and Prime Minister Nikola S.
Mushanov to Belgrade in December 1933 Bulgaria expressed its willingness to join the planned
Balkan Pact. The Yugoslav government and King Alexander aspired to find a solution that
would guarantee Bulgaria’s participation thus leaving it to the Bulgarian authorities to find an
acceptable platform for its participation.19

17

National groups that participated in the conference were represented by unofficial figures that were in
contact with the governments of their countries and their views on the Balkan conference were in line
with the official policy of the country that they represented. Živko Avramovski, “Stav britanske
diplomatije,” 140.
18
In an attempt to preserve the status quo in the Balkans and not allow the unresolved Balkan issues (e. g.
Macedonia) in this area to be the cause of a possible infiltration of Soviet Union influence, British
diplomats were very reserved towards the proposals of their own representatives in Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria, who asked that the British government itself or together with France and Italy, influence
Bulgaria and its neighbors to reconcile. Thus, a 1933 memorandum from the Foreign Office says that it is
not sure to what extent the inhabitants of the territory around Skopje, called Yugoslav Macedonia, “have a
moral right to what might be called minority treatment. They are the raw materials from which, in happier
circumstances, might be made, calm and loyal subjects of Bulgaria or Yugoslavia.” Ž. Avramovski, “Stav
britanske diplomatije,” 147.
19
Italy and Hungary were dissatisfied with these developments and this visit sparked increased discontent
in Greece and Romania as well. Serb intransigence towards Bulgaria's demands which treated the
Macedonians as a Bulgarian national minority, on the one hand and IMRO terrorist activity on the other,
allowed the Greek political circles to hope that the rapprochement cannot come in due time, thus they
were surprised by the rapid development of events. The prevailing opinion was that since Bulgaria had no
inclination of changing its stance towards Greece it opted to break out of its isolation by reaching a
rapprochement with Yugoslavia as their most powerful neighbor. Ž. Avramovski, “Stav britanske
diplomatije,” 150.
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The British government carefully followed the course of these negotiations and insisted
that Bulgaria's inclusion in the Pact should be considered. British and French diplomacies had
insisted upon it, aiming to strengthen the alliance and prevent the spread of German influence in
the region. Since the Yugoslav government held similar views, British political mediation was
carried out mainly through Belgrade. In the beginning of 1934, the Yugoslav government asked
the Bulgarian government to present their standpoint so that it could become a member of the
Balkan Pact. Instead, the Bulgarian government proposed a bilateral non-aggression pact with
other Balkan countries. It was considered insufficient and therefore in February 1934 the Balkan
Pact was signed in Athens without Bulgaria.20
In May 1934, the supporters of the Zveno movement, the Zvenari, executed a coup d'état
in Bulgaria.21 The new government, led by Kimon Georgiev, moved away from Italy, aiming to
consolidate relations with France and establish closer relations with Yugoslavia, as well as with
its other neighbors. For this reason, there was a need to end the conflict with Macedonians.22
Zvenari government sent the army into the Petrich enclave governed by Macedonians and

20

The Balkan Treaty was signed on February 9, 1934 by Greece, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia with
the aim of preserving the status quo of the First World War. Ž. Avramovski, Balkanska antanta, 163;
Fred Singleton. Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (New York, 1976), 81. Nevile Henderson, British Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1935), assessed the
position of Yugoslavia as very difficult, because it had to take into account the wishes of Romania,
Greece and Turkey on one hand. On the other, Yugoslavia had to be careful as not to do anything that
would reverse the trend of rapprochement with Bulgaria. He claimed that Bulgaria, in fact, did not want to
have four allies, it was interested in keeping the territorial status quo, but was trying to find one or more
allies among the stronger of the Balkan countries that would help her gain compensation at the cost of
weaker, or at the cost of Greece. Ž. Avramovski, “Stav britanske diplomatije,” 167–68.
21
In 1927, a Bulgarian supra-party pressure group called Zveno was founded by intellectuals like the
Social Democrat Dimo Kazasov and members of the Military League, most prominently the colonels
Kimon Georgiev and Damian Velchev. The group opposed the party system, government corruption, and
terrorism of IMRO. Its foreign policy aim was to improve relations with Yugoslavia. In 1934 Kimon
Georgiev became the new prime minister and Kazasov become ambassador in Yugoslavia. Frederick B.
Chary, History of the Bulgaria (ABC-CLIO, 2011), 77–8.
22
After signing the International Convention for the Definition for Agression in 1933, the pressure to deal
with IMRO grew considerably, because Bulgarian support for IMRO could be considered as an act of
aggression. R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria, 247.
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arrested Macedonian extremists in other parts of Bulgaria. The leader of IMRO, Ivan Mihailov,
was forced to leave the country. Macedonia, for the first time in many years, was not an obstacle
for the Bulgarian foreign policy.23
In 1935 with the support of Tsar Boris III, a new cabinet was formed in Bulgaria. Its
leader Georgi Kyoseivanov continued the pro-Yugoslav foreign policy. At the same time,
Bulgaria tried to review the Neuilly settlement with Romania and Greece, concerning areas in
the North and the South. The improvement of cultural cooperation was a clear indication of
stronger relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In October 1934, while King Alexabder
arrived on an official visit to France, one of the IMRO members, Vlado Chernozemski, in
collaboration with the UCRO, assassinated him in Marseilles. However, close cooperation
between the two countries continued and was confirmed in 1937 with a signing of a “Pact of
Eternal Friendship.”24
At the end of the 1930s, both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had distanced themselves from
France and were moving towards a closer cooperation with Germany and its allies. In 1938 the
Balkan States – Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente – signed the Salonika Agreements by which
they renounced the use of war and condoned massive rearmament. Thus the agreement enabled
Bulgaria to rearm itself, where previously it had been restricted according to the peace agreement
of Neuilly.25
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After the Salonika agreements, the Macedonian question still remained on the agenda.
Yugoslavia offered a customs union, a military alliance and frontier rectifications, if Bulgaria
would renounce its claims on Macedonia, but although Bulgaria did not wish to fight for
territorial expansion, it was not prepared to give up its claims on Macedonia.26

The Ideology and the Activity of the World Alliance
The WA was established in 1914 as a successor to an Anglo-German organization
founded after mutual visits by British and German church leaders and theologians in 1908 and
1909 to promote friendly relations between the two nations.27 During the accession celebrations
of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1913, the initiators of the WA met industrialist and philanthropist
Andrew Carnegie, who donated two million dollars to promote peace through the cooperation of

26
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all Christian churches. These funds, which were used to finance the activities of WA, were
controlled and distributed by the American based Church Peace Union.28
After the war, the WA gathered for its first meeting in October 1919. There was a brief
confrontation, followed by conciliation between the German and the French representatives.
More importantly several fundamental decisions were made at that meeting. Firstly, it was
decided to support the proposition presented by the Swedish Archbishop Nathan Söderblom to
convene a global Christian conference to discuss the challenges the societies and the churches
were facing.29 Secondly, WA dealt with its constitution and appointed its officials into office.30
Thirdly, WA declared its support to the League of Nations, proposing the League accept all

28
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states that had expressed their wish to join the League and called on the League to respect human
rights and religious freedom.31
One of the cornerstones of the WA’s identity and ideology was the understanding that the
organization was the spiritual equivalent of the League of Nations, the ‘soul’ of the League. As
Dickinson stated in 1920, the League of Nations was based on those principles of international
Christian fellowship the recognition of which the WA was formed to encourage. 32 The League of
Nations was seen as a valuable piece of machinery for dealing with international troubles in a
peaceful manner. But as the WA stated, a will on the part of the peoples was needed to work the
machine in a peaceful way. The spirit of Christian friendship alone could ensure its ultimate
success.33
From the viewpoint of the League of Nations, the WA was one of many social
organizations surrounding the League. In the beginning of 1920s, when the number of such
organizations was still limited, the resolutions of WA even reached the Council of the League,
but they failed to impress the diplomats and no member took any action regarding them.34
The WA as an instrument for promoting peace and friendship, and was interested in
general problems of the world political order. Most of these problems were the outcomes of the
war, e.g., the question of disarmament and the problem of minorities, including religious
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minorities. Among other ecumenical initiatives, it was certainly the most political and politically
orientated organization. In the 1920s, the WA played an especially important role in the
Ecumenical movement. From 1925 the Life and Work movement steadily took on a leading role
in the movement.35 The WA reached its peak in 1928 and thereafter the organization faced a
continuous decline. Its decline was accelerated by the financial crisis beginning in 1929, and the
failure of the World Disarmament Conference in 1934. At the beginning of 1930s, when the
political order in Europe began to shift from democracy to authoritarianism, the WA had lost its
credibility and clarity in vision. Therefore, the emerging regimes, especially National Socialism
in Germany, left the WA in a paralyzed state.36 It did not possess methods to counter the
necessary ideology and policy advanced by the totalitarian regimes.37
The methods used by WA were generally those of the nineteenth century campaigns for
such causes as the abolition of slavery. The aim was to influence public opinion on key issues to
such extent that governments could not ignore the voice of the people. To achieve this goal
debates were initiated, and declarations, petitions and appeals were passed. One cornerstone of
the WA was to organize events for promoting peace, like peace-Sundays. In addition to these
events material on peace-work was printed. The WA also established relations between churches
representatives and politicians. Because the representatives of WA were often leading
35
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clergymen, these relations were established in practice as well as in theory.38 Several leading
members of the WA were also politicians. Over the years, work with the youth, seen as the future
public opinion leaders, gained more and more attention.39
The success of the WA mostly depended on the activity of the local national councils
(NC). In addition to national councils over the years the Alliance began to emphasize more and
more the importance of regional conferences in order to foster relations between neighbors and
to focus on issues related with neighboring societies, e.g. minority questions.40
Harjam Dam in his book on the history of the WA correctly pointed to a
misunderstanding that the WA was an organization of individual Christians and did not represent
the official position of the churches. There were, in fact, two types of councils, based on the
principle of individuality and councils that officially represented the churches. It is true that the
principle of individuality was characteristic to the ideology of the WA and the most successful as
well as the largest council of the Alliance, the National Council of the United States, represented
that individualistic approach. At the same time in Finland, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Poland,
Belgium, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania the councils consisted of official church
delegates. According to Dam, the council members in Yugoslavia and in Bulgaria also officially
represented the churches.41 It is true, however, that the individual ideological approach was more
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or less evident and emphasized by local representatives in those countries as well. Yugoslavia is
a good example to follow.
What has not been emphasized enough in the study of the WA is the fact that over the
years the WA itself evolved. A clear shift in the rhetoric of the organization can be determined in
1928, when advocating for the establishment of the International Court in Hague and announcing
that the Christian community could under no condition support the war, the Alliance claimed to
represent Churches in more than 30 countries and not merely a private group of pacifists.42
By the end of the 1920s, a change of WA’s working methods seemed inevitable. It had
not defined its dogmatic basis, and its ideology was extremely vague in formulation. The WA
activity relied on the work in national councils intended to influence politicians and societies.
Unfortunately, without the Alliance’s necessary ideological and theological background activity
it was not able to guarantee a real success. One has to agree with historians Darril Hudson and
Harjam Dam, who have said that despite the fact that the WA’s appeals and resolutions were
often nothing more than a kind of ‘Christian blessing,’ the Alliance “continued its discussion and
consideration of political issues on a plane once removed from reality.”43 The problem was, in
fact, discussed and analyzed by the members of the WA. In 1932 the issue was raised at a
meeting in Czechoslovakia by a German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who warned the
ecumenical movement and the WA that “without a coherent theology of the Church’s public role
the ecumenical movement risked being at the whim of political trends.”44 Unfortunately, as far as
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the WA was concerned there were no results and therefore in the 1930s the international public
largely ignored the organization. In describing the relations of the WA with the rest of the
ecumenical movement, were much the same. Although in the beginning of the 1930s Henry
Louis Henriod became the joint secretary of the WA and the Universal Council of Life and
Work, the Alliance decided not join the initiative presented in 1937 by the Life and Work and
Faith and Order movements to establish the World Council of Churches. The WA was left to
pursue its aims in a world where its message of promoting peace was less and less heard. After
the Second World War, due to the establishment of the World Council of Churches, the Alliance
was dissolved in 1948.

The Orthodox Community and the World Alliance
The Orthodox community joined the WA after the First World War.45 In 1919, a
delegation of the Faith and Order movement visited the Balkan states. In beginning of 1920 the
Chief International Relations organizer of the WA, George Nasmyth, during his visit to Greece,
KSCS, Romania and Bulgaria met with church leaders and representatives who expressed their
wish to join the international ecumenical movement and the WA. Nasmyth described South
Eastern Europe and the tense relations between the Balkan nations, as the “storm center of
international relations” in his report presented to the Management Committee of the WA. In his
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opinion, there was only one force – namely religion – of enormous power and almost unlimited
opportunity for service, which had so far not been used for peace-promotion purposes. In
countries, that claimed allegiance to the Eastern Orthodox Church as their national faith, no
major conflicts between the churches existed.46 The visit of Nasmyth paved the way for the
Balkan representatives to come to Switzerland in August 1920.47 The month of August was
remarkable, because three different ecumenical organizations meetings were held in Switzerland:
first in Geneva the meetings of the Faith and Order, then the Life and Work and finally in
Beatenberg the meeting of the WA. The Orthodox representatives attended all the meetings.48
The viewpoint of Nasmyth on the high importance of religion in the Balkan states was
true, at the same time the opinion on the harmony between different religious groups has to be
approached with some criticism, because there was, in fact, a misunderstanding between the
BOC and the SOC. As the relationship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia is inseparable from the
history of the Orthodox churches in the two countries, the problems between the churches, of
course, an impact on the relationship between the two countries, being a precondition and an
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important factor in the rapprochement process. Furthermore, according to the principles of
church and state relations in Orthodox countries, the church was considered to be an essential
part of state-building and often took part in state functions, particularly in fostering foreign
relations.49 Thus, the contribution of the Alliance and its impact on the relations between the two
states has to be analyzed in a more detailed manner.
Another fact, which has to be analyzed with some caution, is the membership principle of
the WA’s national committees in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. As stated earlier, according to Dam,
the council members in Yugoslavia and in Bulgaria officially represented the churches.
However, according to Yugoslav religious media the WA activity in Yugoslavia was considered
to be a private initiative.50 Having said that, it is also true that WA’s national committee
members held high positions in the two churches and in their societies that enabled them to
conduct the church and state foreign policy in a more private and noncommittal manner.51
The WA national Committee of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, NCSCS,
held its first meeting in February 1921. The committee had seven representatives from the
Orthodox Church, seven representatives from the Lutheran Church and three representatives
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from the Reformed Church. During the first years, the presidency rotated between several
clergymen. During the first two years, the President of the Committee was Metropolitan
Archbishop of Banat, Ilarion Radonić.52 In 1923 Nicholai Velimirovitch, (Nikolaj Velimirović),
an ecumenically minded Bishop of Žiča and the diocese of Ohrid, replaced him.53 In 1924
Professor Irinei Georgevitch (Djordjević) became the President of the committee, holding the
same position at the beginning of 1930s. In 1923, he had succeeded a theologian Professor Dr.
Voyslav Janitch (Vojislav Janjić)54 as a representative of the NCSCS in the Management
Committee of the WA and remained in this position until 1928.55 Janitch, an MP, had been the
first secretary of the NCSCS. There had been a separate secretary for the Protestant members of
the committee since the establishment of the committee. The first secretary was Samuel
Schumacher, a pastor of Petrovopolje.56 Among the vice-presidents were Serbian Bishop Irinei
Ćirić57 and Patriarch Gavrilo (Gabriel) Dožić (after 1938).58
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From 1925, the President of the NCSCS was Irinei Ćirić, Bishop of Novi Sad. The
Yugoslav media repeatedly stated that “the main merit of maintaining links with foreign fraternal
Churches belonged to Bishop Irinei, who was the real spiritus agens in all such ideas and
movements.”59 From 1929 Irinei belonged to the Executive Committee of the WA, from 1930
served as Chairman of the Management Committee and from 1939 was the President of the
entire organization.60 In addition to Irinei, there were several ecumenically minded bishops and
theologians who took part in the WA’s activity. Most of them were also active in the work of the
YMCA and other international ecumenical organizations.61 Among the members of the NCSCS
were Archimandrite Valerian Pribičević, Archpriest Gabriel Milošević, Episcopal administrator
Adam Vereš, Bishop Mark Kalođera, and senior Jacob Jahn.62
The Bulgarian National Council, BNC, also established in 1921, was from the very
beginning led by the Metropolitan of Sofia, Archbishop Stefan (Gheorghiev), who, like Irinei,
was one of the leading representatives of the entire WA.63 From the early stages of the WA
Stefan belonged to the Management Committee. He was an influential church leader, one of the
key people representing the Orthodox community in the WA. From 1927 he served as a member
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of the administrative board of the WA.64 Another member, whose activity had an impact on the
entire WA, was Prof. Stefan Zankov, who, at first served as a secretary of the BNC and was in
1933 appointed as a special secretary of the WA for the entire Orthodox community. 65 The vicepresident of the BNC was Dr Paissiy, Bishop of Znepole. At first, there was a corresponding
secretary for the evangelical denominations. Pastor D. N. Furnajiev, who filled that post, later
became a longstanding treasurer of the BNC.66
The fact that the WA appointed a secretary for the Orthodox community proves the
importance the Orthodox community had in the Alliance. A precondition for achieving a
stronghold within the WA was the influential position the churches had in the societies of South
East European countries. There is, however, another and a more problematic side to this – the
burning issues which had emerged in the same societies, for it was precisely for this reason the
Orthodox community gained so much attention in the WA.
As in Western or Eastern Europe, each country in South Eastern Europe had its own
problems to tackle and the internal issues of each of them had to be resolved first. They were
mainly the outcomes of the national awakenings in the second half of the nineteenth century, the
results of the Balkan wars, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the aftermath of
First World War. These conflicts not only influenced the internal situation of each country, but
had an impact on foreign relations with neighboring countries as well.
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He served as the corresponding secretary until 1925. The World Alliance for Promoting International
Friendship through the Churches. Handbook of the World Alliance 1925. International Office, (London,
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It is no surprise that these problems were mentioned in the reports of national
committees. Greece, for example, mostly dealt with the consequences of Turkish repression of
Greek civilians, whereas the NCSCS tackled a problem of minorities, which according to the
report of the NCSCS was a new challenge to face. Interestingly enough, the question of
minorities in the context of foreign relations was not on the agenda of the national committees
until the mid 1920s. Both the BNC and NCSCS since their establishment had organized public
events to promote the ideas of the WA and considered it necessary to get their governments to
support the aims of the organization.67
To some extent they succeeded, so when in 1921 Dickinson made his first visit to the
KSCS Dr. Janitch organized meetings with the Foreign Minister, Minister of Religion (Public
Worship) and with Metropolitan Ilarion Radonić, who was the president of the NCSCS, as well
as with Metropolitan Josif Cvijović. After Janjić had explained the aims of the WA, Metropolitan
Josif expressed his sympathy for the movement, saying that the entire Orthodox Church would
support the WA that serves to promote friendship among nations. Janjić organized a meeting
with the representatives of Protestant Churches in the KSCS, who were members of the
NCSCS.68 The impression Dickinson had from the visit was twofold: on the one hand he had
heard complaints from the Protestants about the violation of religious freedom and human rights
of the minorities; on the other hand he had had conciliatory discussions during his visit and
therefore believed that the WA was in fact doing a good thing in promoting friendly relations. He
believed that the KSCS in principle respected the rights of minorities. However at the same time
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he remained cautious because of the centralizing policy of the state, i.e. a policy that claimed
Serbia to have a central position in the state.69
To maximize the effect of the WA’s work in the region, the Alliance initiated regional
conferences, the first of which was organized in Novi Sad in July 1923. Delegates from the NC’s
of the KSCS, Romania and Hungary attended it; however representatives of Bulgaria did not
participate, because they could not obtain passports.70 The conference adopted a resolution on
the racial, religious, and linguistic rights of minorities and the tasks of the Church in the
protection of these rights.71 Dickinson, who in the 1920s chaired the International Federation of
League of Nations Societies and promoted the ideas of the League of Nations all over the world,
visited national councils from Constantinople to Athens in 1926. On that occasion, he wrote in a
report: “The two chief danger spots of Europe lay in the Balkans and on the German-Polish
frontier and every action which tends to remove misunderstandings between the peoples of these
countries has undoubted value in the preservation of world peace.”72
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A resolution, first adopted in Athens, was once again presented at a Balkan regional
conference held in Sofia in 1927, to emphasize the need to foster friendly relations between the
Balkan countries. It was suggested that a real achievement would be to organize Orthodox
conferences, cooperation between Balkan theological faculties and even publish a journal for the
Orthodox community.73 These statements were, however, overshadowed by the growing tensions
between the churches and states of Bulgaria and KSCS.

Relations between Serbian and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches in the Early 1920s
After the First World War the Tsardom of Bulgaria and its church were put in isolation.
Along with other Central Power countries Bulgaria had lost the war, and the foreign relations of
the BOC were limited because of its tense relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.74
The SOC, at the same time, gained a stronger foothold in the Orthodox community than
before the First World War. After the war the SOC, in principle, supported the stance of the

‘Konferencija Svetskog Saveza’, Vesnik, 36 (October 16, 1927).
The liberation movement of Balkan nations against Turkish domination began early in the nineteenth
century, when at first semi-dependent and then independent states of Serbia, Greece, Romania and
Bulgaria were established. A process of establishing new local churches followed it. The Ecumenical
Patriarch in Constantinople first granted autonomy and later full autocephaly to churches in Serbia,
Greece, and Romania. The borders of the newly established churches coincided with the borders of the
new states. Bulgarians had lost their church independence in 1767. However, the Bulgarian Church
declared its separation from the jurisdiction of Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1860 and in 1870
established an Exarchate. The Ottoman Sultan recognized it the same year, but the Patriarchate of
Constantinople did not and at a council meeting in 1872 condemned the BOC as schismatic and broke off
all contacts with it. It was a complex issue because Bulgaria was not, at that time, an independent state.
The church, however, wished to consolidate its position in Bulgarian society and fought for an
independent Bulgaria, although its position was not always positively recognized. As the Ecumenical
Patriarchate did not recognize the BOC a part of the Church worked under a parallel hierarchy. M.
Mazover, Balkan – kratka istorija, (Belgrade, 2003), 114; James Lindsay Hopkins, The Bulgarian
Orthodox Church: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Evolving Relationship Between Church, Nation and
State in Bulgaria (New York, 2009), 129–141; Momchil Metodiev, “The Ecumenical Activities of the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church: Reasons, Motivations, Consequences,” Religion in Eastern Europe, XXXII,
3 (2012), 4.
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Ecumenical Patriarchate and considered the BOC as a schismatic church.75 In 1921, during the
first council meeting of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad [ROCA], where Metropolitan
Stefan represented the BOC, Serbian Patriarch Demetrio did not allow Stefan to prolong his stay
in Sremski Karlovac. It was Nikola Pašić, the prime minister of the KSCS, who orchestrated this
policy towards Metropolitan Stefan.76
Stefan’s visit had a follow-up in the Serbian press, where a number of critical articles
were published. Most importantly the articles criticized the decision to accept Bulgaria as a
member of the League of Nations. The Bulgarians were seen as war criminals and therefore the
decision to accept the Bulgarian Metropolitan on the soil of the KSCS was criticized. It was said
that the Bulgarian Church had not deserved the invitation from the ROCA hierarchy and that
Stefan had come to the KSCS without the invitation and approval of the Serbian Patriarch.77
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ml (last accessed February 14, 2014).
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The leaders of SOC and ROCA suffered consequences as well. The Russian Metropolitan
Anthony (Антоний – Алексей Павлович

раповицкий) was attacked on the basis that he had

no right to receive visitors on the territory of the Serbian Patriarchate, especially those whose
hands were covered with the blood of Serbian priests. The press emphasized that Stefan, as an
envoy of the Bulgarian government, came to S. Karlovac to plead with the Russian Synod to
intervene for the removal of the anathema pronounced against the Bulgarian Church by the
Patriarchate of Constantinople while the Prime Minister Alexander Stamboliyski “openly flirted
with the Communists in Bulgarian Parliament.” In conclusion it was stated that conciliation with
Bulgarians depended on the Bulgarians themselves and sincere repentance from the BOC was
needed.78 It is fair to suggest that because of conflicts that had taken place in the recent past the
Serbian Patriarchate and the KSCS felt offended. Having become more influential in the Balkan
region after the First World War, they used the influence to put pressure on Bulgaria and its
church to demand repentance.
The attitude had a more personal touch as well. Namely, the KSCS Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was very suspicious of the activities of Metropolitan Stefan. As Stefan was the leader of
the BOC, it affected bilateral relations in general. According to a report from May 1923 these
suspicions were caused by the alleged activities of the Metropolitan during the war in
Switzerland, including his connections with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church.79

1921), 1; “Štipski prota,” Vesnik, 44 (October 31, 1921), 3; “Naši rodoljubivi mučenici,” Vesnik, 50
(December 12, 1921), 1.
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Criticism and suspicions varied with reconciliation and willingness to establish friendlier
relations. In an article, published in the official newspaper of the SOC, Glasnik Srpske
Pravoslavne Patrijaršije, Glasnik SPP, in 1923, it was stated that the BOC had not been entirely
in agreement with the Bulgarian government at the time of the Balkan wars. The newspaper
referred to an article published in a Bulgarian religious magazine, Pastirsko delo, where the
church had distanced itself from the atrocities in Serbia, declaring that they had been against the
war and asked for forgiveness. Here, Stefan's escape from Bulgaria and stay in Switzerland
during the war was mentioned in a positive context.80 Nevertheless, a year later, Glasnik SPP
bluntly declared that the Bulgarian people had in the past and were in the present acting against
the Serbian people with the blessing and support of Bulgarian priests.81

The World Alliance – a Mediator in the Rapprochement Process between Bulgarian and
Serbian Orthodox Churches
The BOC managed to end its isolation by joining the ecumenical movement. In doing so,
it helped to establish diplomatic relations with some of Bulgaria’s neighboring countries.82 This
can be considered as one of the two major achievements of the WA. The other was that the WA
created a forum for Balkan churches to negotiate issues related to the outcomes of the Balkan

1915, continuing his studies at a Protestant university in Geneva until 1919. According to Bulgarian
sources, he actively participated in diplomatic affairs through contacts with representatives of the Entente
and different Bulgarian emigrant and student groups, as well as the Bulgarian embassy. His complex
diplomatic activity during the war was the main reason for him to be distrusted. Allegedly he was one of
the agents of the military attaché of the Bulgarian embassy in Bern to whom he passed information on the
plans of the Entente countries towards Bulgaria, as well as information on military operations. His
information was particularly valuable in 1916 when the idea on concluding a separate peace treaty
between the Entente and Bulgaria was discussed. He was also involved in secret negotiations between
Bulgaria and the Entente in 1917. Р. Пенджекова, Личността и делото, para. I, 1.1.
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Wars and the First World War. The latter, however, at first managed to worsen even further the
relationship between the two churches, but in the 1930s these dissensions were overcome.
In 1924, Bishop Nicholai Velimirović, as a leading member of the NCSCS said in
connection with a plan to convene an ecumenical meeting, that the Bulgarian schism was a
bilateral problem between Constantinople and the BOC. It had nothing to do with other
Orthodox churches. In fact, while some members of the Orthodox community took notice of the
dispute, the rest of the community had a neutral stance concerning the matter. Nicholai referred
to the SOC as being among the neutral churches. As the churches worked together in the WA,
Nicholai considered it impossible for the WA to justify its name without the participation of the
BOC.83
Publically the SOC considered the BOC as their equal.84 In reality, however, the SOC
was rather cautious and therefore bilateral relations remained modest until the end of 1920s. At a
council meeting of the SOC in 1928, after analyzing the activity of the WA, it was decided to
monitor the BOC and although speeches were delivered to promote cooperation between the two
churches, in the end it was stressed that cooperation should be informative in the present state of
affairs.85
Still, there were a few occasions, when the two churches established contacts. For
example, after an earthquake in southern Bulgaria in April 1928, Patriarch Demetrius of the SOC

Episkop ohridski Nikolaj, “Vaseljenski sabor i Bugarska crkva,”, Vesnik, 7 (March 1, 1925), 1. The
Archpriest and the President of the SOC Priests Association, Miloš Andjelković shared the same view
and advocated for the settlement between Constantinople and the BOC in an article, published in 1925.
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sent 1,000 dinars as aid for the victims. Another 100,000 was collected by the SOC church
members and delivered to Bulgaria by a special envoy. On that occasion the Synod of the BOC
and Demetrius briefly corresponded.86
Most importantly, the representatives of the two churches met at the WA meetings. In
September 1927 a regional conference of the WA took place in Sofia, with participants from
three Balkan countries – Bulgaria, the KSCS and Romania. The Greek delegation did not
participate because of a conflict on the Greek-Bulgarian border. The conference was presided
over by Willoughby Dickinson, who remained in Sofia after the conference to discuss the
question of minorities. A clear sign of openness for friendlier relations was the fact that
Bulgarian clergy served a solemn liturgy together with Bishop Irinei Ćirić.87 In general, the
conference advocated for a deeper commitment to foster friendly relations between the Balkan
states and societies. To achieve this goal an idea was presented to establish an organization of
National Orthodox Churches, based on common faith and Orthodox Christian canonical
principles. In an article, published after the conference in the newspaper Vesnik, the BOC was
praised for its work and for educating young scholars.88
Willingness to cooperate was mutual, though it did not mean that the KSCS had
overcome the umbrage of the past, or that Bulgaria and its church were prepared to give up
claims on Macedonia and to tolerate the policy of its neighbors in areas which they considered to
be their territory. Another issue regarded the refugees who were staying in Bulgaria.89 As the

И. Снегаров, “Отношенията,” para. III. Сръбската църква.
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WA saw itself a defender of minorities, it did not come as a surprise that Bulgaria raised the
question of protecting their minorities in neighboring countries in the WA. Already presented in
the mid-1920s, the demands of the BNC had become louder since 1929. They had a profound
impact on the bi- and multilateral relations of Balkan countries and their churches in the
following years.
The NC reports published in 1928 allude to the emerging conflict over minorities. The
KSCS report praised its own policies–minorities were represented in the parliament– while at the
same time criticizing the Bulgarian government for supporting illegitimate activities on the
territory of the Kingdom of SCS. According to the report, this issue was a serious obstacle for
WA to gain a broader reception of its work. The BNC mentioned that it had dealt with Bulgarian
minorities living in neighboring countries and stated that the work had unfortunately showed no
results.90
A regional conference, which was to be held in the spring of 1929, might have eased the
situation, but because the constitution was suspended and a personal royal dictatorship was
introduced by King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the conference was postponed and tensions
escalated. In the summer of 1929 Metropolitan Stephan submitted a memorandum to the WA on
violence against the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia. He saw it as a threat to peace in the
Balkans. It is fair to suggest that he represented the views of the Tsardom of Bulgaria. The WA
as an instrument for peace was therefore obliged to find a peaceful solution to the conflict

discussed during the debate, which started in 1929. It did not have any positive effect on the relations
between two Churches.
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through its network. At the same time, the Serbian clergy were criticized for their views and
activities during the Ottoman rule in the Bulgarian journal, Cъrkoven vestnik.91
The appeal was put on the agenda of the Management Committee session in September
1929 in Avignon. Before the discussion a private meeting had been organized, where the
representatives of the SOC and the BOC decided to remove the memorandum from the agenda of
the Alliance until further notice, and instead organize meetings of the two NCs to resolve the
situation.92
According to a report by Bishop Irinei Ćirić, sent after the meeting to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav side as an act of friendship agreed
that the first meeting was to be held in Sofia. The meetings were supposed to result in a decision
on convening a regional conference that was to be held in Belgrade.93
Returning from France to Bulgaria Metropolitan Stefan passed through Belgrade, but
there is no indication that he met the SOC representatives. A few weeks later he invited a
Yugoslav diplomat, Ljubomir Nešić, for a meeting and according to Nešić complained that he
was in a very difficult position because the memorandum had been withdrawn in Avignon. The
withdrawal had been a result of an agreement with Yugoslav delegates, but now Bishop Irinei
wished to go back on the agreement. Nešić advised him to negotiate directly with the Yugoslav

Bishop of Štip, Venjamin, was criticized because of his speech at the funeral of the victims of the
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delegates and avoid public controversy. Stefan trusted Nešić to deliver his letter to Yugoslav
delegates.94 Postponing the planned Yugoslav visit to Sofia made the Bulgarians anxious.
As there was no settlement and the regional conference had been postponed, the WA
discussed the question once again in 1930 and decided to interfere by sending the leading
representatives of the WA to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to reach an agreement between the two
sides. In January 1931 honorary secretaries Henry Atkinson and Jules Jézéquel first visited
Yugoslavia, and later Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for the second time. During their first stay in
Belgrade they had meetings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as with the representatives
of the local NC. It was agreed that the regional conference of four neighboring countries should
take place in May of 1931. However, during their visit to Bulgaria, the BNC refused to accept
the decision to organize a regional conference before a bilateral meeting. Therefore, a
preliminary meeting was agreed upon, to take place at the beginning of May 1931. The Yugoslav
National Council (YNC) accepted these terms and the honorary secretaries left Belgrade with an
agreement to summon the regional conference after a private meeting between the two parties.
Both meetings were to be held in May 1931.95
By March, all the necessary arrangements for the conference, beginning with the
invitations and ending with a program, had been made. Unfortunately, at the last minute, the
YNC refused to visit Bulgaria, because it felt insulted by a speech, delivered by Metropolitan
Stefan at a funeral in Sofia, where he had mentioned that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was
oppressing the Bulgarians on its territory. In fact, it was the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs, who had cancelled the authorization for the visit to Sofia. Although it had grudgingly
approved a conference in Belgrade, the decision not to go to Sofia meant that the regional
conference in Belgrade was meant to be a failure, because the Bulgarians could not accept the
invitation.
The YNC was now in a difficult position because they had promised to send their
representatives to Sofia twice, but had failed to do so. At that moment there appeared to be
tensions between the WA and the YNC. When Jézéquel in his letter to Bishop Irinei mentioned
the decision of the YNC not to go to Sofia, the Bishop of Bačka in his answer considered the
statement insulting and even questioned the future membership of the YNC in the WA.
However, at the same time more constructive opinions were presented. Irinei Ćirić in a letter to
Willoughby Dickinson and Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze pointed out that the YNC was willing
to ignore Stefan’s speech, as long as the same attitude was not practiced as the general line of
Bulgarian policy. Dickinson and Siegmund-Schultze expressed their hope to find a peaceful
solution.96 In June 1931, the WA meeting of the Executive Committee discussed Bishop Irinei’s
letter that explained that the YNC had intended to go to Sofia, but were prevented by ‘certain
events’. Irinei asked Dickinson, whether he should resign from the Executive Committee. The
committee decided that there was no need for him to do so and that the question of Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia should be put to the agenda of the WA Cambridge International Committee
conference in September 1931.97
In this context it comes as no surprise that the bilateral relations between two churches
worsened at the beginning of the 1930s. There were a few signals of relief, and the conflict
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between the two churches escalated in general.98 In 1930 the question of bilateral relations was
on the agenda of the SOC Council, where it was once again decided to monitor the BOC. 99 At
the same time, a debate on the history and the relations of the two countries began on the pages
of Bulgarian religious journals Tserkoven Vestnik and Pastirsko delo and Yugoslav journal
Vesnik.100 In August 1930 Archpriest Bogoljub N. Milošević, who claimed to be a supporter of
Serbia's rapprochement with Bulgaria, wrote in Vesnik that the final goal of the rapprochement
had to be a complete unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and the creation of a powerful state,
‘whose hips will be leaning on the Julian Alps and the Black Sea and the shoulders on the
Morava and Vardar valley.” In order to achieve this the churches had to join forces. He criticized
the attacks on Bulgaria by his fellow countrymen in connection with the crimes committed in the
past and appealed not to open old wounds.101 The Bulgarian media described his views on the
full-scale unification as chauvinistic and patronizing. The Bulgarians accused the Yugoslav side
for oppressing Bulgarian minorities and other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. Milošević wrote in
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his reply that the Yugoslavs did not see the population of Macedonia as an ethnic minority.
Macedonia was a province of Yugoslavia, where the people were of same blood and faith as all
other Yugoslavs. Furthermore, he opposed the Bulgarian accusations of ‘Serbian chauvinism’ as
a greatest impediment to the Bulgarian-Serbian rapprochement. According to him the biggest
obstacle for rapprochement was the activity of “Bulgarian protégés’ from Macedonia –
‘makedonstvujušči’, who were responsible for the hatred, disorder and killings.”102 The language
used remained the same, as it had been in 1920s.
There were no signs of tension between Yugoslav state authorities and the representatives
of the SOC,103 but it seems that the steps of the state authorities, i.e. withholding permission for
the church to participate in a meeting with the BOC representatives, had put the clergy in an
uncomfortable position. In August of 1931, the Bishop of Niš, Dositei, in his letter to the
Patriarch of the SOC, Varnava (Rosić), mentioned that he had met Bishop Irinei, who was
confused, because state authorities had not yet given him permission to travel to the WA
conference in Cambridge.104
Metropolitan Stefan of the BOC planned to issue a statement in Cambridge on the
discrimination of Bulgarian minorities in Romania, Greece and Yugoslavia. The latter received
the strongest criticism. The first contact in Cambridge clearly signaled a clash ahead, however,
Bogoljub N. Milošević, “Srpsko-Bugarsko bratstvo,” Vesnik, 18 (1930), 1.
According to the constitution of KSCS/Yugoslavia and the church laws, the SOC was an autonomous
and independent organization. In practice, however, the SOC was under the supervision and monitoring
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (until 1929) and thereafter the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of
Education. Furthermore, the SOC was financially dependent on state. The SOC did not have a
Department for Foreign Affairs, so the clergy worked closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Radmila Radić, Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970, I–II (Belgrade 2002), I/23.
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after private talks between the parties the situation was once again eased, so that the discussions
that followed could be described as more constructive than emotional. However, it did not mean
that the conference reached an agreement, which would have been satisfying for both parties.
After an overview of events surrounding the Balkan regional conference and the statement by
Bishop Irinei, in which he on behalf of the YNC expressed readiness to visit Sofia, it was again
decided that the regional conference was to be held in Belgrade as soon as possible, but only
after the YNC had visited Bulgaria. The Yugoslav delegation opposed the idea that the visit
should be marked by a specific deadline. There was, however, a significant proposal added to the
Balkan regional conference resolution–the Greeks offered a solution by proposing that the next
Balkan regional conference could be held in a country other than Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, if the
two countries should in the nearest future fail to come to an agreement.105
As it was thought to be a good solution to end the status quo, the WA proposed to
organize the next Balkan regional conference in Bucharest. The Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs
were willing to accept the decision, although it managed to cause unrest. In the annual BNC
report for 1931, the committee described the WA’s reputation in Bulgaria as ‘of pessimistic
character’, because in analyzing the two major issues the WA focused on–disarmament and
minorities–Bulgaria in both cases felt that the WA had failed them. The Bulgarian committee
also expressed its deep regret that the question of minorities was removed from the agenda of the
Bucharest meeting, although it had been accepted at first.106
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Bishop Irinei also noted that he fully understood what the postponement of the Yugoslav visit to Sofia
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(1931), 234-6
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Since 1929 Metropolitan Stefan had aimed to present a memorandum to attract public
attention to the violation of human rights of Bulgarian minorities in the neighboring countries.
However, the Yugoslav delegation had managed to remove the issue from the agenda through
negotiations. Nevertheless, the memorandum was once again put on the agenda at the WA
Management Committee meeting in Geneva in August 1932.
According to the minutes of the meeting the memorandum was followed by an extensive
discussion. Although Bishop Irinei and the Yugoslav representatives did not agree with the
estimates of two million Bulgarians, who had lost their ecclesiastical independence outside of
Bulgaria and whose civil rights were violated, the Bulgarian delegation managed to achieve for
the first time, what they had come for–after a discussion the WA decided to appoint a minorities
commission of seven members to discuss the matter. The Management Committee admitted that
the decision was in fact a result of the incompetence and lack of solid information about the
matter. However, it did not mean that the issue was forced to become a subject of endless
discussions at committee hearings. Concerning the regional conference the Management
Committee expressed its hope that the conference would take place in Bucharest in spring
1933.107
The Yugoslav reaction, presented in newspaper Glasnik SPP was predictable–the
information presented during the meeting had in their opinion been misleading. They went even
so far as to ask whether they should remain in the WA.108 Yugoslavs firmly opposed to any kind
of activity that could have had an effect on their stronghold in Macedonia. For example in
January 1933, Professor Sergei Troicki of the Orthodox Theological Faculty in Belgrade,
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published an analysis of the BOC Constitution project, criticizing their claim of jurisdiction over
dioceses in Macedonia, Southern Serbia and for the Diocese of Niš–all now belonging to the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the SOC. Troicki argued that from the canonical point of view the
BOC had no right to present such allegations, because the unity of Macedonian provinces had
been confirmed by the official acts of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. There was no need for
consent from the BOC to pass these acts and as the BOC was officially considered schismatic,
thus it was impossible for the SOC to negotiate with the BOC. Having said that, Troicki admitted
that the Slavic Orthodox churches had not accepted the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
on the BOC nor had they declared the decision wrong. He called upon the BOC to drop the
demands and initiate negotiations with Orthodox churches to end the schism.109
Only a month later the public statements changed considerably. For example, in an article
“We and the Bulgarians” published in Glasnik SPP, the national unity of Bulgarians and
Yugoslavs and the ecclesiastical union between the two churches was hailed.110 It was an
implication of the events to come. In early May 1933 a delegation of the SOC–Bishop Nikolai,
Irinei Ćirić, Voja Janjić and priest Milovoi M. Petrović – finally visited Bulgaria, with the aim of
negotiating on issues of peace and friendship between the two churches. In view of earlier events
the visit was most certainly approved by the Yugoslav state authorities. During the talks in Rila
monastery, presided over by Metropolitan Stefan, it was confirmed that a WA regional
conference should be organized in Belgrade. A resolution of mutual interests was passed to
foster the friendly relations between the two churches and countries.111 The council of the SOC

Sergei Troicki, “Projekat Ustava Bugarske crkve,” Glasnik SPP, 5 (Feb. 2/Jan. 20, 1933), 74–5.
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acknowledged the initiative officially, but at this state it was advised to proceed with private
consultations.112 The same month in cooperation with the Life and Work movement, the Balkan
regional conference finally took place in Bucharest.113 The correspondence continued between
church representatives with the aim of signing a resolution of mutual interests, but unfortunately
a meeting, which was planned for that purpose in Rila, was postponed. In the fall of 1933, the
rapprochement of the two states began, when in September the visits of the Bulgarian and
Yugoslav royal couples took place.114 On the arrival of the Bulgarian royal couple to Belgrade
the Yugoslav media emphasized the contribution of the Orthodox churches in the rapprochement
between the two states.115 In September the representatives of the Yugoslav delegation attended
an international meeting of the WA in Sofia.
After the first steps of reconciliation the SOC was still cautious in its actions. The SOC
General Assembly recommended in the spring of 1934 to continue monitoring the work of the
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BOC, especially in the light of discussions on its new constitution. If needed, the Assembly
suggested protecting the rights of the SOC with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
decision was repeated in 1935.116
Interestingly enough, at the same time the SOC tried to ease the schismatic position of
BOC among the Orthodox Churches. In November 1933, Metropolitan Gabriel Dožić visited the
Patriarch of Constantinople and among other things discussed the issue of the Bulgarian schism.
He was instructed in Belgrade to emphasize its administrative character. The Patriarch assured
him that through negotiations and with good will all questions would be taken under
consideration.117
In February 1934, the Balkan Pact was signed, but Bulgaria did not join. In May, after the
coup in Bulgaria the rapprochement between the two churches and states continued. What needs
to be emphasized is the fact that, even at this stage, the churches still used the WA NCs for
further negotiations. It proves that there was a certain amount of uncertainty about its success
and the WA was used as a third and experienced party. On the other hand, taking into account
the fact that the persons who negotiated were either church leaders or senior clergy, it proves that
the negotiations had to be approved at the highest possible level by the SOC as well as the
Yugoslav state, as it was the state that directed the policy of the church in foreign relations. It
also shows the importance the WA had gained in the region.
The conference, which was attended by the representatives of the Bulgarian and
Yugoslav NCs, had been initially planned to take place in Rila monastery in 1933, was held in
September 1936 in the Yugoslav city of Ohrid, in the Monastery of St. Naum. Although it was
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the BNC who came, it was organized as if it was an official visit of the BOC. Before the
negotiations the prominent Bulgarian delegation–Metropolitan Stefan,118 Bishop Paisie of
Vratsa, Dr. Stefan Zankov, Archpriest Dimitar Andreev (протоиерей Димитър Андреев),
secretary of the Clergy Union and George Tsvetinov (Георги Цветинов, Head of the
Department of Religion at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria) and Deacon Nikitin – met
with Patriarch Varnava, Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović, Prince Regent Paul, and other
Yugoslav officials. They attended the celebration of King's birthday, participated in the parade of
troops at Banjica, and during their tour in Yugoslavia gave speeches on the cooperation between
the two nations. It was hoped that the contacts between the intellectuals would help to achieve
the desired peace and overcome the prevalent suspicions towards the Balkans among WestEuropean countries.119
Before the meetings in the Monastery of St. Naum, Stefan and Irinei celebrated the Holy
Eucharist together. The meetings concluded with an eight-point resolution, where both sides
stressed the need to continue work on deepening the relationship between the two churches and
nations. It was stated that the Rila resolution from 1933 had been acknowledged by bishops and
clergy in both countries and it had become the cornerstone for the process of strengthening the
mutual understanding between government leaders, as well as church leaders and social
organizations in both countries. The NCs praised the late King Alexander I and Tsar Boris III for
their contribution in re-establishing a friendly relationship between the two countries and prayed
that the same kind of enthusiasm would continue to characterize their relations in future. The
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resolution ended with an emotional statement of the two nations of same blood and same faith
standing together in unity. Dr. Vojislav Janjić presented an official statement, emphasizing the
importance of the visit in achieving “our common objective,” meaning an agreement of mutual
trust. The media coverage was, in general, positive. Only Glasnik SPP still emphasized the
informal character of the visit.120
Rila and the Ohrid meetings were one of the most important prerequisites for the
ecclesiastical, as well as political rapprochement of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.121 Bulgarian Prime
Minister, Georgi Kjoseivanov, wrote in an article published in 1936 which argued that
rapprochement had begun three years ago and that there were still some unresolved issues
between the two countries. At the same time the two countries started negotiations to finalize a
non-aggression pact.122
From 1936 onward, the Orthodox churches in the Balkan countries united their forces
against Western spiritual influence in all of its positive and negative aspects such as secularism,
materialism, and capitalism, and against the Western concept of the separation of church and
state. The ecumenical movement, which significantly expanded after World War I, was also
discussed. They initiated a new form for the meetings–an Orthodox Theological Congress. The
first such meeting was organized in 1937 in Athens and the next gathering was planned for 1939
in Bucharest.123 At the same time, the WA, representing the Western liberal spirit, objected to
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signals of violation of religious freedom regarding the activity of minority religious associations
in Yugoslavia.124
Bilateral relations of the BOC and the SOC were normalized in next few years. In 1937
discussions were held on the recognition of the ordination of the Anglican Church. In April
1939, students from the Faculty of Theology in Sofia visited Belgrade.125 In a speech held in
Novi Sad in 1939 Professor Zankov described the Serbs and Bulgarians as fellows sharing a
spiritual kinship and blood.126 Yugoslav media advocated for the lifting of the schism.127 The
cooperation continued in the first year of the Second World War, when in March 1940 a
Committee for printing common liturgical books held a meeting in Sofia. Tsar Boris III met the
SOC delegation.128 When Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact in March 1941, it changed the
position of Bulgaria in the region considerably and nulled the 1937 Bulgarian-Yugoslav Pact.129
Bishop Irinei and Metropolitan Stefan, now Exarch Stefan I, after the BOC autocephaly was
recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1945, met for the last time in Bulgaria in May
1946, where the delegation of the SOC attended the celebration of Holy John of Rila.130
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Conclusion
During the interwar period, the relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were
characterized by conflicts and mutual distrust. The dissensions were the consequences of the
Balkan wars and the First World War. Bulgaria was among the countries that had lost the First
World War, which meant reparations, an obligation to reduce its army, and the loss of territories.
The latter was the reason for future conflicts, because Bulgarians had to give up a large part of
Macedonia, where according to their estimates over ninety percent of the population were
Bulgarians. The Kingdom of SHS carried out a policy of assimilation, claiming that in terms of
the ethnic origin the population of Macedonia was mostly Serbian. They were strongly opposed
to the activity of IMRO, whose representatives resided in Bulgaria and often violently fought for
an autonomous or independent Macedonia. IMRO was a threat to Bulgarian stability as well, but
at the same time it enabled Bulgaria to re-establish their influence and regain their lost territories
in the region.
The Macedonian question made it difficult for the two countries to normalize bilateral
relations. There were several stages in the rapprochement process that were mostly influenced by
the internal politics of the two countries. However, there was a religious dimension as well,
which has not yet been analyzed. Most importantly it involved the activity of an ecumenical
peace organization the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the
Churches.
The WA was the most influential ecumenical organization in the region. It did not
officially represent the churches, but at the same time the leading and senior clergy of the two
churches represented the organization. The key roles in the activity of the national committees
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and in the entire WA were played by bishops Irenei Ćirić and Nikolaj Velimirović from the
SOC, and by Metropolitan Stefan and Professor Stefan Zankov of the BOC.
As the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not canonically recognize the BOC, the ecumenical
movement was seen as a possibility to end its isolation. In addition to regaining its position in the
Orthodox community, the BOC in its foreign relations activity represented the Tsardom of
Bulgaria. For this reason it raised the question of the violation of the rights of Bulgarian
minorities in neighboring countries.
The WA became a diplomatic channel for negotiations between the SOC and the BOC
representatives. In 1928 the BNC raised the question of minorities at a WA meeting in Avignon.
The NCSCS managed to avoid public discussions in the WA through private negotiations for
several years. At the same time the SOC expressed its willingness to support the BOC by calling
the BOC to drop the issue of minorities and start negotiations to achieve the canonical
recognition from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Despite the fact that the BNC refused to remove the question from the agenda and
refused to participate in the WA regional conference in Belgrade until the Yugoslav delegation
privately visited Bulgaria to negotiate on the minorities’ issue, Yugoslav state officials refused to
grant permission for the NCSCS to go to Bulgaria, which was the reason for the continuance of
the conflict in the following years. No regional conference took place until 1933. During that
time the members of BNC and NCSCS met regularly at WA meetings.
In 1932 the BNC finally managed to discuss the matter at a WA meeting in Geneva.
Although the representatives of the Yugoslav NC opposed any kind of interference concerning
Macedonia, the WA, with its lack of knowledge about the issue, decided to establish a Minorities
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Committee. Although the Yugoslav delegation was not in favor of such a decision, it
nevertheless managed to ease the situation in the long run.
In 1933 the Yugoslav delegation finally visited Bulgaria. During the talks in Rila
monastery a resolution of mutual interests was passed to foster friendly relations between the two
churches and countries. Both heads of states exchanged short official visits the same year. The
visit of 1933 and the negotiations conducted through the WA have to be considered as vital
diplomatic channel in the rapprochement process. The WA offered a suitable alternative to
church and state officials for negotiations. Even more important is the fact that the talks among
WA representatives were carried on even when state support was not granted.
The rapprochement process between state and church representatives continued in the
next years. In 1936 the WA members met in the Monastery of St. Naum of Ohrid in Yugoslavia.
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia signed a pact of eternal friendship in 1937. The SOC supported the
removal of the schism from the BOC and the two churches were engaged in several cooperation
projects.
In general, the WA paved the way for the SOC and BOC for a deeper commitment to
foster friendly relations between the Balkan churches and societies to overcome the historical
and political differences between the two states. Although there were obstacles to achieve that
goal, the aim of the WA, and especially the idealistic stance of the WA representatives in
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, has to be highly valued. Although their work in the rapprochement
process between the two countries was curtailed, their contribution in reaching a mutually
satisfactory resolution and friendly coexistence between the two states has to be acknowledged.
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